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LIFTING THE PSLRA "AUTOMATIC STAY" OF DISCOVERY
BRIAN PHILIP MURRAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)I added
identical provisions to the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") staying discovery dur-
ing the pendency of a motion to dismiss. 2 These provisions make securities
claims the only cases litigated in federal court in which discovery is stayed
in these circumstances. 3  Although the discovery stay operates auto-
matically, courts have discretion to lift the stay, something they are doing
with increased frequency. 4 This article will discuss the circumstances under
which courts grant relief to plaintiffs seeking to lift the discovery stay, and
the policy reasons for and against such relief.
II. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND
MOTIONS TO STAY DISCOVERY PRIOR TO 1995
In the federal courts, discovery proceeds despite a motion to dismiss in
every sort of case except those alleging claims under the Securities Act or
Exchange Act.5 In 1995, after intense lobbying by accountants, under-
writers, and high-tech companies, both the Securities Act and Exchange Act
were amended to state, "In any private action arising under this chapter, all
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any
motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to that party." 6 The rationale behind these amendments
was two-fold: to save defendants the cost and burden of discovery in a case
that might be dismissed and to prevent plaintiffs from filing a case without
having sufficient information to meet the heightened pleading requirements
* Mr. Murray, J.D., cum laude, St. John's University School of Law; M.A., B.A., University
of Notre Dame, is a member of Murray, Frank & Sailer, LLP.
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77et.seq., 78et. seq. (2000)).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000).
3. See id.
4. See infra Part III.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
6. Id.
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of the PSLRA and then using discovery to acquire sufficient information to
avoid dismissal. 7 The House and Senate managers of the PSLRA Congress
found that approximately 80% of the cost of litigating securities class ac-
tions was associated with discovery and such costs should be incurred by a
litigant only after the court ruled on the sufficiency of the complaint. 8 They
further found that the "threat that the time of key employees will be spent
responding to discovery requests and after forces coercive settlements." 9
Prior to 1995, a defendant in a federal securities case would have to
participate in discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. In
order to avoid discovery, a defendant would have to move for a protective
order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c) and request a stay
of discovery.10 To succeed, defendants would have to show good cause that
they would suffer harm if such stay was not granted."m
Usually, defendants would attempt to show their motion to dismiss
should be granted and discovery would therefore be premature or burden-
some. 12 When a defendant asserted that dismissal was likely, motions for
stays required courts to make "preliminary finding[s] of the likelihood of
success on the motion to dismiss."13 Since every defendant who files a
motion to dismiss contends that it will prevail, this specious logic could
result in a stay in every case in which stay motions were filed.14 If a court
did not rule on the stay motion until it decided the motion to dismiss, a
defendant could grant itself a de facto stay by delaying production until the
court ruled on the stay motion.
When courts did rule on the motion to stay discovery, Rule 26 places
the burden of persuasion on the party seeking the protective order. 15 To
meet this burden, the party seeking the protective order would attempt to
show good cause by demonstrating that the discovery would produce an
"undue burden and expense,"16 and courts would consider the relative
7. Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996); Lapicola v.
Alternative Dual Fuels, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,765 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2002); 141 CONG.
REC. H14039-02(1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
8. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 731, 732.
9. Id.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
11. Id.
12. Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39,40 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
13. Id.
14. Id. ("Such general arguments could be said to apply to any reasonably large civil
litigation.").
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (stating that the court may order that discovery not be had
"for good cause shown").
16. E.g., Twin City Fire. Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wasau, 124 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Nev.
1989).
406 [VOL. 80:405
2004] LIFTING THE PSLRA "AUTOMATIC STAY"
hardship to the non-moving party.17 A showing that discovery might in-
volve some inconvenience and expense was not sufficient to establish the
good cause necessary for the stay.18 Most often, courts denied the motions
to stay discovery.19 With the passage of the PSLRA, all this became
unnecessary.
III. LIFTING THE STATUTORY STAY
Absent a showing of "undue prejudice," courts abide by the new statu-
tory scheme of staying discovery during the pendency of a motion to
dismiss in a securities case. 20 The concept of "undue prejudice" is open to
interpretation. The only example cited in the PSLRA's legislative history is
"the terminal illness of an important witness," which might "necessitate the
deposition of the witness prior to the ruling on the motion to dismiss."
21
Courts have taken a flexible definition of "undue prejudice." One court in
New York has defined it to mean improper or unfair treatment rising to a
level somewhat less than irreparable harm.22 Although the same definition
is used in the Ninth Circuit as by the Southern District of New York, the
courts differ in their interpretations. One judge in the Southern District of
New York has held "if the absence of discovery would essentially protect
defendants from liability, undue prejudice would result;"23 a sentiment
17. See Kron Med. Corp. v. Groth, 119 F.R.D. 636, 637-38 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (considering
impacts of cost to counsel who must reacquaint themselves with a case and the concern that
evidence may be lost).
18. Twin City Fire Ins., 124 F.R.D. at 653.
19. Moran v. Flaherty, No. 92 CIV. 3200 (PKL), 1992 WL 276913, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
1992); In re Chase Manhattan Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 6092 (LMM), 1991 WL 79432, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1991); Bio Feedtrac, Inc. v. Koliner Optical Enters. & Consultants, No. CV 90-
1169 (EHN), 1991 WL 85951, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1991); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133
F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Shields v. Silk Greenhouse, Inc., No. 89-1612-Civ.-T-15A, at 1-2
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 1990); Moss v. Hollis, 1990 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 95,443, 97,260 (D.
Conn. June 29, 1990); Shields v. NCNB Corp., Nos. C-C-90-0090-MU & C-C-90-0099-MU, 1991
WL 146854, at *1-*2 (W.D.N.C. June 20, 1990); Twin City Fire Ins., 124 F.R.D. at 653; Simpson
v. Spec. Retail Concepts, 121 F.R.D. 261, 263 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Howard v. Galesi, 107 F.R.D.
348,350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
20. Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 720-21 (S.D. Cal. 1996);
Novak v. Kasaks, 11996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 99,307, 95,861-62
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996).
21. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693.
22. Vacold, LLC v. Cerami, 1,1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 91,334,
95,505 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2001) (quoting Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am., 917 F. Supp. at 720). One
court held that it was not undue prejudice when an eighty-year-old plaintiff lost her life savings
and the case might not proceed without discovery. Sarantakis v. Grattadauria, No. 02 C 1609,
2002 WL 1803750, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2002).
23. Faulkner v. Verizon Comm., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). "Simple
delay" does not qualify as undue prejudice. In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp.
2d 286, 287 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2002).
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supported by another judge in that district.24 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
has held that "failure to muster facts sufficient to meet the [Exchange] Act's
pleading requirements cannot constitute the requisite 'undue prejudice' to
the plaintiff justifying a lift of the discovery stay." 25
A. ALLOWING THIRD-PARTY DISCOVERY
Even when all defendants move to dismiss, courts have discretion to
lift the discovery stay. 26 Courts have shown a willingness to lift the dis-
covery stay if it is necessary for the plaintiff to subpoena willing witnesses
who are barred from cooperating due to confidentiality agreements. 27 In In
re Flir Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation,28 the court lifted the discovery
stay to allow plaintiffs to subpoena a willing third-party witness who was
prohibited from speaking to them absent the subpoena due to the terms of
an employment contract's confidentiality provision. 29 The court held that it
was significant that the discovery was directed against a third-party rather
than a defendant and noted that the discovery stay was intended to protect
defendants from unnecessary discovery costs, but that concern was not im-
plicated when the deposition was not of a defendant or a current employee
of a defendant.30 The court also noted that the deposition was not part of a
fishing expedition since the deponent had filed a civil complaint in state
court corroborating plaintiff's allegations. 31 The court reasoned,
The PSLRA is a shield intended to protect security-fraud
defendants from costly discovery requirements, not to be a sword
with which defendants can destroy the plaintiffs' ability to
obtain information from third parties who are otherwise willing to
disclose it. Allowing defendants to seek dismissal of plaintiffs'
24. Vacold, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 95,505.
25. SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 189 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1999).
26. Most courts are in agreement that a defendant's announced intention to file a motion to
dismiss is enough to invoke the statutory stay. In re DPL Inc., Sec. Litig., 247 F. Supp. 2d 946,
947 n.4 (S.D. Ohio 2003); In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133
(N.D. Cal. 2002); In re Carnegie Int'l Corp. Sec. Litig, 107 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682-83 (D. Md.
2000); In re Trump Hotel S'holder Derivative Litig., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 5 99,537, 97,653 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1997). But see Dartley v. Ergobilt, 1998 WL 792500,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 1998) (holding that the stay is only mandatory if motion to dismiss is
already filed); Novak v. Kasaks, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 99,307, 95,861
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996) (stating it denied earlier request to stay discovery because motion to
dismiss was not yet filed).
27. E.g., In re Flir Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 91,308, 95,746 (D.
Or. Dec. 13, 2000).
28. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,308.
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complaint without affording plaintiffs the opportunity to discover
Palmquist's information regarding defendants' fraud-information
which is known to exist and which has been withheld only as a
result of defendants' efforts to silence Palmquist-would result in
"undue prejudice" to plaintiffs.32
In Anderson v. First Securities Corp.,33 a situation similar to Flir
arose.34 The plaintiffs located a willing third-party witness who had ob-
tained details about the alleged fraud during the third-party's due diligence
for an aborted merger with the defendant.35 The third-party was prevented
by a confidentiality agreement from sharing the information with the plain-
tiffs but was otherwise willing to do S0.36 The defendants opposed lifting
the stay, arguing that the plaintiffs would not suffer undue prejudice if the
stay was not lifted and that the plaintiffs failed to identify the "par-
ticularized discovery" they sought.37 The court rejected defendants' argu-
ments, holding that the plaintiffs would suffer undue prejudice if they were
not permitted to conduct the limited discovery and that since plaintiffs had
already articulated the basis of liability, the discovery would not be a fish-
ing expedition.38 To ensure that a fishing expedition did not result from the
discovery, the court limited the discovery to information relating to issues
or claims already alleged in the complaint.39 The same result was reached
in Dartley v. Ergobilt,40 in which the court allowed one deposition of a
willing third-party witness who resided beyond the subpoena power of the
court, holding that the deposition would not frustrate the intent of the stay
provisions.4 1 The court held that the situation fit the exception in the
PSLRA for particularized discovery necessary to preserve evidence.42
Allowing willing third-party witnesses to give depositions is not the
only situation in which courts are willing to lift the statutory discovery
stay. 43 In Global Intellicom, Inc. v. Thomas Kernaghan & Company,44 a
32. Id. (citation omitted); see also In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d
1127, 1136-37 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (amending confidentiality order to allow willing third party
witnesses to speak to plaintiffs' investigators).
33. 157 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah. 2001).
34. Anderson, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-42.





40. No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-1442-G, 999 WL 792500 (N.D. Tex Nov. 4, 1998).
41. Dartley, 999 WL 792500, at *2.
42. Id.
43. E.g., Global Intellicom, Inc. v. Thomas Kernaghan & Co., No. 99 CIV 342(DLC), 1999
WL 223158, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999).
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group of short-sellers was sued in federal court by a company the short-
sellers were suing in state court.45 The short-sellers were suing in state
court to force conversion of preferred stock and, in effect, to take over the
company; the company was suing the short-sellers in federal court for
violating federal securities laws when the short-sellers drove the stock price
down.46 The company claimed it would suffer prejudice because the short-
seller's success in the state court action would "moot [plaintiff's] ability to
seek redress" in its own action.47 The court found this was sufficient prej-
udice and allowed the limited discovery requested. 48 One court has dis-
tinguished between "discovery" and "disclosure" and ordered production of
a defendant's insurance policies, holding that it is no burden to simply
photocopy an insurance policy and its production will not help bolster the
allegations of an otherwise unsustainable complaint.4 9
B. ALLOWING DISCOVERY OF NON-MOVING DEFENDANTS WHEN
SOME DEFENDANTS MOVE TO DISMISS AND SOME DEFENDANTS
ANSWER THE COMPLAINT
In a case involving multiple defendants, when some defendants move
to dismiss and some defendants answer the complaint, courts are placed in a
bind. The defendants who have answered the complaint will participate in
discovery; the only question is when. Staying discovery with regard to the
answering defendants does nothing but delay the action, running afoul of
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which aims at securing the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 50 Some dis-
covery, either documents or depositions, is inevitable even for a dismissed
defendant if one party has answered, provided it is possible to serve the
44. No. 99 CIV 342(DLC), 1999 WL 223158 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999).
45. Global Intellicom, Inc., 1999 WL 223158, at *1.
46. Id.
47. See id.; see also In re Pac. Gateway Exch., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 00-1211 PJH (JL),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18433, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2001) (allowing limited discovery of
bankrupt defendants to prevent evidence from being lost); Tobias Holdings, Inc. v. Bank United
Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (allowing discovery for state law claims
while staying discovery on federal claims when basis of jurisdiction for state claims was
diversity). But see Angell Investments, L.L.C. v. Purizer Corp., No. 01 C 6359, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17782, at *5-*7 (N.D. I11. Oct. 31, 2001) (refusing to allow discovery on related state law
claims even if there was an independent basis for jurisdiction).
48. Global Intellicom, Inc., 1999 WL 223158, at *2.
49. In re Comdisco Sec. Litig. 166 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1262-63 (N.D. Ill. 2001). But see
Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to distinguish
between discovery and initial disclosures and holding initial disclosures were covered under
statutory stay).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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dismissed defendant with a subpoena.5' Nevertheless, a moving defen-
dant's interest in this inevitable discovery hinges on the outcome of the
motion to dismiss. If the motion is granted, the dismissed defendant will
have no interest in the discovery of other defendants or plaintiffs. How-
ever, if the motion is denied, the defendant will obviously want to cross-
examine any deponents.
In Adair v. Kaye Kotts Associates, Inc.,52 the decision to permit limited
discovery reflected these concerns. 53 In Adair, the plaintiff sued an issuer,
the signatories to the registration statement, and the issuer's auditor for
claims arising from an initial public offering.54 The company and the
individual defendants answered, but the auditor moved to dismiss. 55 The
plaintiff wanted to take discovery, and the auditor objected.S6 The judge
issued a memo endorsement, allowing document discovery to proceed and
requiring the parties to report back to the court before depositions were to
begin.57 The memo endorsement stated,
There are multiple defendants in this action and only one has
moved to dismiss. I agree that discovery against that defendant,
Feldman Radin, should be stayed. Discovery[,] ... particularly
with respect to documents, should proceed among the other
defendants. At the point depositions are to commence, the parties
should advise the court in order for the court to determine if the
Feldman stay should continue. 58
Thus the plaintiff received documents from the non-moving parties,
which would have been produced eventually regardless of the outcome of
the motion to dismiss. 59 As for depositions, if the motion to dismiss was
granted, the moving defendant would have had no reason to participate in
the depositions, whereas it would have wanted to protect its interests at the
depositions if it remained a party. The auditor won its motion to dismiss
before depositions began and the issue of deposition discovery was never
decided.60
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C).
52. No. 97 CIV. 3375(SS), 1998 WL 142353 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1998).
53. Adair, No. 97 CIV. 3375(SS), 1998 WL 142353, memorandum endorsement, Sept. 24,
1997 (on file with author).
54. Adair, No. 97 CIV. 3375(SS), 1998 WL 142353, at *1.
55. Id.
56. See Adair, No. 97 CIV. 3375(SS), 1998 WL 142353, memorandum endorsement, Sept.




60. Adair, No. 97 CIV. 3375(SS), 1998 WL 142353, at *1.
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In In re Aid Auto Stores, Inc. Securities Litigation,61 a case brought
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act against a company, two individual
defendants, and the company's auditor, only the auditor moved to dismiss.62
The non-moving defendants did not argue that the statutory stay applied to
them, and, as in Adair, document discovery commenced against those
defendants.63 The plaintiffs moved to lift the statutory stay against the
auditor, arguing that (1) the auditor would eventually produce the
documents either as a defendant or a third-party, (2) the bulk of the
documents had already been produced in another litigation arising out of the
same facts; and there would be no burden on the auditor to simply make
another copy of this prior production, and (3) there would be undue
prejudice if the plaintiff in the other litigation were to advance its case to
trial first and take the company's limited assets.64 The auditor opposed the
motion, arguing that the plaintiffs wanted to obtain information prior to a
decision on the motion to dismiss to bolster the allegations in the
complaint.65 The court held an oral argument and issued a one-line order
denying the motion to lift the stay against the auditor "for the reasons stated
on the record at the end of oral argument." 66 Magistrate Judge Boyle stated
at the close of the oral argument on this issue that the plaintiffs were under
a heavy burden to lift the stay, and "[w]hile I ordinarily would not be
inclined to stay discovery under these circumstances, I'm obliged to enforce
the provisions of the PSLRA... ."67 The non-moving defendants did not
argue the statutory stay applied to them, and discovery proceeded as to
them while stayed against the auditor.68
A district court in Massachusetts decided the issue of whether
discovery should proceed against defendants who moved to dismiss and had
the motion denied when motions to dismiss by other defendants were still
61. No. CV-98-7395 (DHR) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2000).
62. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Lift the Stay of Discovery
at 1-2, In re Aid Auto Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig. (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2000) (No. CV 98-7395 (DRH)).
63. Id. at 4.
64. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their Motion to Lift the Stay of
Discovery at 2 - 4, In re Aid Auto Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig. (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. CV 98-7395
(DRH)).
65. Transcript of Civil Cause for Motion Before the Honorable E. Thomas Boyle United
States Magistrate Judge at 10, In re Aid Auto Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig. (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2000) (No.
CV 98-7395 (DRH)) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
66. Civil Conference Order, In re Aid Auto Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig. (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2000)
(No. CV 98-7395 (DRH)).
67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, In re Aid Auto Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig. (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
2, 2000) (No. CV 98-7395 (DRH)).
68. Civil Conference Order, In re Aid Auto Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig. (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2000)
(No. CV 98-7395 (DRH)).
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pending.69 In In re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation,70 the court
found that allowing discovery against those defendants was consistent with
the intent of the stay provision since such discovery would not be a fishing
expedition or an attempt to coerce an innocent party into discovery. 71 The
court also reasoned that once the motion to dismiss was denied and the
mandates of the PSLRA were satisfied, "the general presumption for liberal
discovery provides the backstop." 72 The court allowed document requests
and interrogatories upon the parties who lost the motion to dismiss and
document subpoenas on non-parties, limited to the claims sustained against
the moving parties. 73 No depositions were to be taken without leave of the
court.
74
C. ALLOWING DISCOVERY AGAINST A MOVING DEFENDANT
In Adair and Aid Auto Stores, discovery proceeded against the non-
moving defendants but remained stayed as to moving defendants. 75 Courts
have recently begun allowing discovery even as to the moving defendants. 76
The third argument advanced by the plaintiffs in Aid Auto Stores, that there
would be undue prejudice because plaintiffs in other litigation would have
an advantage, echoed the decision of Global Intellicom77 and recently car-
ried the day in In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation.78 In Worldcom,
there was no decision on a motion to dismiss or an answer, but the judge
held that under the "unique circumstances" of the case, where the complaint
was "clearly not" a fishing expedition or an attempt to coerce a settlement,
production of documents was permitted for documents already produced in
other litigations.79 Worldcom had already produced documents to the
United States Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and a law firm representing Worldcom's special
investigative committee. 80 The United States Attorney for the Southern
69. In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106-07 (D. Mass 2002).
70. 214 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass 2002).
71. Lernout & Hauspie, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07.
72. Id. at 107.
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id.
75. See supra Part III.
76. In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
77. Global Intelligence, Inc. v. Thomas Kernaghan & Co., No. 99 CIV 342, 1999 WL
223158, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999).
78. Worldcom, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
79. Id. at 305.
80. Id.
2004]
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District of New York was also conducting a criminal investigation.81 The
plaintiffs filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to modify the bankruptcy
stay to permit production of documents produced in connection with
governmental and internal investigations or produced to the Creditors'
Committee, and the motion was granted. 82 The issue then was whether the
district court would modify the PSLRA stay of discovery. 83 The court held
there were two purposes behind the PSLRA stay provisions: minimizing
incentives to file frivolous actions in the hopes of coercing a settlement
through high discovery costs and preventing plaintiffs from finding a
sustainable claim not alleged in the complaint. 84 The court held that neither
concern was implicated and that the plaintiffs would suffer undue prejudice
without the discovery:
Without access to documents already made available [to litigants
in other cases or bankruptcy creditors] NYSCRF would be
prejudiced by its inability to make informed decisions about its
litigation strategy in a rapidly shifting landscape. It would essen-
tially be the only major interested party in the criminal and civil
proceedings against Worldcom without access to documents that
currently form the core of those proceedings .... If [the plain-
tiffs] must wait until the resolution of a motion to dismiss to obtain
discovery and formulate its settlement or litigation strategy, it
faces the very real risk that it will be left to pursue its actions
against defendants who no longer have anything or at least as
much to offer. 85
The second argument advanced in Aid Auto Stores, that the documents
had already been produced in another case, carried the day in the Enron liti-
gation. 86 The plaintiffs moved for a limited modification of the automatic
stay in bankruptcy court to obtain documents produced by Enron in
response to legislative or executive branch investigations. 87 The bank-
ruptcy court agreed to lift the automatic bankruptcy stay, provided the
district court would lift the PSLRA stay. 88 The defendants argued that the
plaintiffs made no claim that particularized discovery was essential to
81. Id. at 302.
82. Id. at 304.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 305.
85. Id. at 305-06.
86. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Deriv. & "ERISA" Litig., Nos. MDL-1446, Civ.A. H-01-3624,
2002 WL 31845114, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16,2002).
87. Id. at *1.
88. Id.
[VOL. 80:405
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preserve evidence or prevent prejudice. 89 Citing the Cowen case, the
defendants argued that the complaint must "stand or fall based on actual
knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than information produced by defendants
after the action has been filed."90 In turn, the plaintiffs claimed the docu-
ment request posed no threat of abusive litigation and the "defendants"
therefore should not be allowed to hide behind the statute." 9 1 The plaintiffs
further argued that any burden on the defendants would be slight, since the
defendants had previously located, reviewed, and organized the docu-
ments. 92 The district court held that while the PSLRA discovery stay was
to protect defendants from unnecessary discovery costs, "[i]n a sense this
discovery has already been made, and it is merely a question of keeping it
from a party because of the strictures of a statute designed to prevent
discovery abuse," and ordered production of the documents." 93
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing SG Cowan Securities Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 189 F.3d 909, 912
(9th Cir. 1999)). In somewhat different circumstances, a similar argument was rejected on a
request for leave to amend. In In re Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. Equity Securities
Litigation the court upheld a fraud complaint against certain defendants but granted the motion as
to the auditor. In re Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc. Equity Sec. Litig. 271 F. Supp. 1007, 1018-21
(E.D. Mich. 2003). The court granted leave to amend with regard to the auditor after discovery,
holding "there is no fear that this is merely a baseless strike suit. Instead, because the plaintiffs
have had no discovery, they simply do not have the specifics to determine what KPMG knew and
what they should have known." Id. at 1020 n.9. Thus, the court was unconcerned that an amend-
ed complaint might incorporate the fruits of discovery because the case was already found to be
meritorious against the other defendants and was not a fishing expedition. Id.
91. In re Enron Corp., 2002 WL 31845114, at *2.
92. Id.; see also In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 92,291, 91,809 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2003) (allowing production
of documents during pendency of motion to dismiss when documents had already been produced
to government agencies and the plaintiffs were not engaged in a fishing expedition); Tobias
Holdings, Inc. v. Bank United Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (allowing
discovery of state claims pled in same complaint as federal claims and finding requested discovery
was not a fishing expedition and case was not frivolous). But see Rampersad v. Deutsche Bank
Secs., No. 02 Civ.731 1(LTS)(AJP), 2003 WL 21074094, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003) (finding
no "categorical exception" to discovery stay because of a governmental investigation). The AOL
decision was later vacated pending reconsideration after the amended complaint was filed. In re
AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. 02-MDL- 1500, 2003 WL 21229703, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2003). After the amended complaint was filed, the court refused to lift the stay
to allow for production of documents produced to governmental agencies, holding there was no
concern defendants would not preserve evidence and there would be no undue prejudice. In re
AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. 1500, 02 Civ. 5575(SWK), 2003 WL
21729842, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2003).
93. In re Enron Corp., 2002 WL 31845114, at *2. However, in Faulkner v. Verizon Comm.,
Inc. the court refused to allow production of documents which had been produced in another case.
Faulkner v. Verizon Comm., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In Verizon, the
plaintiffs subpoenaed documents from a party to another litigation that had been produced by the
defendant in their case. Id. at 401. The plaintiffs argued it was no burden to defendants since the
documents had already been produced. Id. at 405. The court refused to lift the stay to allow
production of the documents but did note that defendants should not use the "stay as a shield to
insulate themselves from liability." Id.
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The Worldcom and Enron holdings were followed in a somewhat
limited fashion by In re Williams Securities Litigation.94 In Williams, the
defendant had been subject to several governmental investigations and
produced documents in response to these investigations.95 The plaintiffs in
the civil securities fraud action sought a partial lift of the stay, arguing it
was necessary to preserve the evidence and avoid undue prejudice.96 The
court held that since the defendants kept copies of the documents it pro-
duced to the government, there was no risk of loss of relevant evidence.97
However, the court held that since the documents had already been
organized and copied, it would impose no hardship on defendants to pro-
duce them to plaintiffs, and since the plaintiffs represented that the infor-
mation in the documents would not be used to defeat the motion to dismiss,
which was already fully briefed, or to amend the complaint, enforcing the
stay "would not serve any interest the PSLRA was enacted to advance." 98
This represents a slight modification of the Worldcom, AOL, and Enron
holdings in that the documents would only be used to evaluate the case for
settlement purposes and not to amend the complaint.99
IV. REFUSING TO LIFT THE STATUTORY STAY AT ALL
In In re CFS-Related Securities Fraud Litigation,lOO one defendant
answered the complaint prior to the other defendants motions to dismiss.101
The answering defendant and plaintiff served document requests on each
other and served responses to the requests without producing.any docu-
ments. 102 The individual defendants then moved to dismiss, and the
answering defendant moved to dismiss cross-claims pled against it.103 The
answering defendant then refused to produce documents responsive to the
plaintiff's document requests despite its earlier agreement to do so, citing
94. In re Williams Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-72H(M), 2003 WL 22013464, at *4 (N.D. Okla.
May 21, 2003).
95. Id. at *2.
96. Id. at *3.
97. Id.
98. Id. But see In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571(HB), 2003 WL
21035383, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2003) (refusing to lift stay despite plaintiffs assurances that
information would not be used in complaint); In re Lantronix, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 02-03899
PA, 2003 WL 22462393, at *1-*2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2003) (refusing to lift stay to allow
production of documents produced to government, despite defendant's admission that part of the
complaint sufficiently plead fraud, because there was no showing the documents were necessary
for settlement discussions and no risk they would be lost).
99. See In re Williams, 2003 WL 22013464, at *3.
100. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (hereinafter CFS I).
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the discovery stay triggered by the motion to dismiss.104 In CFS I, the issue
was whether plaintiffs would be permitted document discovery from the
non-moving defendants.105 When plaintiffs moved to compel, the court
held that "[a]s long as any defendant has filed a motion to dismiss claims
arising under Chapter 2B of the 1934 Securities Act, the PSLRA stays 'all
discovery,' even discovery against answering, non-moving defendants."1
06
The court's rationale was that if the stay were not granted, "the PSLRA's
stay would be of little benefit to those defendants who do move to
dismiss."107 The court reasoned that a moving defendant will, at a mini-
mum, want to "monitor" discovery between plaintiffs and the other parties
to protect its own interests. 108 In addition, the court said it would be
inefficient to have the non-moving defendants respond to document re-
quests twice, which it would have to do if the moving defendant lost its
motion and then served document requests on its co-defendant. 109
The court in CFS I eventually denied the defendants' motions to
dismiss.110 The defendants then filed cross-claims and counterclaims
against each other, and moved to dismiss each other's claims.", Some
defendants also filed third-party complaints against various ratings agencies
and other entities, and the third-party defendants also moved to dismiss.112
The court then had to determine whether the PSLRA discovery stay
operated against defendants who moved to dismiss cross-claims by other
defendants or the third-party defendants.113 With regard to defendants
against whom the plaintiffs' claims had been upheld, the court refused to
stay discovery."l 4 The court held that the discovery stay was intended to
prevent a defendant from incurring needless discovery costs until a court
determined that a plaintiff pled a prima facie case.115 The court reasoned
that with regard to defendants in the main case, that determination had been
made, and all defendants would remain parties to the suit regardless of the
determinations regarding the cross-claims. 116 With regard to the third-party
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1264.
106. Id. at 1263.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1263-64.
110. Id. at 1262.
111. In re CFS-Related Sec. Fraud Litig., 213 F.R.D. 435, 436-37 (N.D. Okla. 2003)
(hereinafter CFS 11).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 442-44.
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defendants, the court stayed discovery, holding that there had been no
determination of the adequacy of the complaints against them and that there
should be no discovery prior to a determination that a complaint had been
properly plead. 17
In CFS II, the court took pains to state it "is not distancing itself from
its prior ruling.""18 However, it is hard to reconcile the two opinions. In
CFS II, the court relied in part on the Lernout case, which allowed
discovery against defendants against whom the complaint was upheld while
motions to dismiss by other defendants were still pending."19 In allowing
discovery to proceed in CFS II while motions to dismiss were pending, the
court looked beyond the language of the statute to its intent, which it did not
do in CFS 1.120 If the same reasoning had been used in CFS I as was used in
CFS H, the court would likely have allowed discovery against the parties
who answered the complaint, because, using the reasoning in CFS H,
"regardless of the court's decision with regard to those remaining motions
to dismiss, [these defendants] will remain as parties to this lawsuit."121
V. LIFTING THE STAY IS APPROPRIATE IN SOME INSTANCES
The stay during a motion to dismiss is an exception to the general rule
that discovery should commence as soon as possible and therefore should
be narrowly construed.122 Many courts have stated that by passing the
discovery stay provisions of the PSLRA, Congress was stating that there
should be no discovery until the court rules on the sufficiency of the
complaint. 23 When a party answers a complaint, it is admitting the suf-
ficiency of the complaint, and the reasons supporting the stay do not apply
to that party. Discovery of an answering defendant, whether through docu-
ment production, depositions, or interrogatories, is inevitable, and the cost
will be incurred eventually. There is no reason to stay document discovery
against an answering party, as the Adair court recognized.124 However,
depositions involve non-moving parties as well, and a credible argument
can be made that moving parties should not be forced to bear the costs of
preparing for depositions of answering parties. If the moving party wins its
117. Id. at 447.
118. Id. at 446.
119. Id. at 445 (citing generally Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.
Mass 2002)); see also supra Part III.C.
120. In re CFS-Related Sec. Fraud Litig., 213 F.R.D. 435, 446 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
121. Id.
122. CIR v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).
123. In re CFS-Related Sec. Fraud Litig., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2001).
124. See supra Part II.B.
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motion, time spent preparing for and attending depositions of answering
parties will have been wasted. However, an equally credible argument can
be made that depositions should be allowed of the moving party. Since one
party has answered, discovery and depositions are inevitable. Even if the
moving party prevails on its motion to dismiss, it can be deposed pursuant
to a subpoena. Thus, the moving party will not incur unnecessary costs pre-
paring for its own depositions, since it will inevitably incur those expenses
anyway.
When a defendant answers a complaint or loses a motion to dismiss,
the general purpose of the PSLRA is satisfied in that a defendant or a court
has decided the claims are at least facially meritorious and should proceed
towards trial.125 The balancing between the general purposes of the federal
securities laws, which are essential to public confidence in the securities
markets, and the narrow purpose of the stay provisions of the PSLRA is
best accomplished by allowing discovery against non-moving defendants.
This allows faster resolution of cases, which brings closure for defendants,
investors who lost their money, and the investing public which needs
confidence that transgressions of the securities laws are dealt with quickly
and justly. The federal securities laws were passed in the 1930s to help
restore investor confidence in the public securities markets after the stock
market crash of 1929.126 If the securities laws are viewed by the public as a
source of interminable delays to recovery, especially with regard to
defendants who have admitted the sufficiency of the allegations against
them, investor confidence in the securities markets will be undermined.
With the need for strong securities laws and effective remedies now more
evident than ever after the debacles of Enron, Worldcom, and others, the
wisdom of the PSLRA is in doubt and some in Congress are calling for its
wholesale repeal.127 The PSLRA should be afforded the narrowest con-
struction possible, and the civil litigation contemplated by the federal
securities laws should be allowed to proceed so that these cases have the
quickest possible resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many courts have lifted the PSLRA's discovery stay for a variety of
reasons.128 The situation where one party answers the complaint, making
125. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 731, 732.
126. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
127. Representative Bart Stupak of Michigan sponsored a repeal bill in February 2002, The
Shareholders and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2002, H.R. 3829, 107th Cong. (2002).
128. See supra Part Ill.
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discovery inevitable, moots most of the concerns which motivated Congress
to include the discovery stay in the PSLRA.129 In these circumstances, it is
appropriate to lift the stay with regard to document discovery.130 This helps
insure the speedy disposition of the case and imposes no unnecessary bur-
den on the moving defendants. By limiting the discovery to documents, the
moving defendant is protected from the potentially unnecessary cost of
depositions of the answering parties. Finally, there is no danger of a
plaintiff "discovering" his or her way into a sustainable complaint since the
answering defendant has admitted by answering that there is no basis to
challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint.'31
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
[VOL. 80:405
